Elbow Room: Free Will, Responsibility, and the Myth of Absolute Freedom

“Do I dare
Disturb the universe?
In a minute there is time
For decisions and revisions which a minute will reverse.”

– The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock by T.S. Eliot

In 1968, Lieutenant Hugh Thompson, a helicopter pilot in the United States Army, found himself in a moral quandary of epic proportions. On what started as a routine reconnaissance mission in the Vietnam War, Thompson and his crew accidentally stumbled into the My Lai massacre—a horrific event where American soldiers massacred hundreds of unarmed Vietnamese civilians, including women and children. But Thompson’s decision that day wasn’t just a military maneuver; it was a moral pivot that changed the course of his life, and perhaps history itself.

Amid the chaos, Thompson made a choice that no one expected: against orders and risking his career, he landed his helicopter between the soldiers and the civilians, effectively stopping the massacre. It was an act of extraordinary bravery, a singular example of moral courage in an environment that offered little room for either. In Thompson’s own words, he followed his "moral compass"—a compass that made him act despite the peril and personal cost. But here’s the kicker: while Thompson’s decision seems to radiate an aura of absolute free will, it wasn’t made in some empty space of pure autonomy. No, his actions were influenced by his military training, his upbringing, and—let’s be real—his biology. Thompson’s moral clarity wasn’t born in a vacuum; it was the result of a cocktail of psychological, social, and biological influences. His actions weren’t "free" in the way we tend to imagine freedom, but they were undeniably meaningful.

This contradiction—the tension between moral responsibility and the limitations of free will—is exactly what Daniel Dennett explores in Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting. Dennett, a philosopher famous for his non-absolute stance on free will, would argue that Thompson’s decision wasn’t about having no constraints; rather, it was about exercising "elbow room"—the space within which meaningful action is still possible, even when surrounded by limitations. Dennett doesn’t deny that our choices are influenced by everything from biology to environment; he just thinks that our freedom lies not in the ability to choose without limitations but in how we navigate those limitations. But does that mean we're still really free? Or are we just the sum total of our influences?

In this essay, we’ll delve into Dennett’s ideas on free will, bringing in a hefty dose of Robert Sapolsky’s more skeptical, neuroscientific determinism. By using Thompson’s story as our guiding light, we’ll explore how free will and responsibility are shaped by biology, the environment, and good old-fashioned moral reflection.

The Problem of Free Will: Myth and Reality

"Freedom is what you do with what's been done to you." – Jean-Paul Sartre

"It’s a dangerous business, Frodo, going out your door. You step onto the road, and if you don’t keep your feet, there’s no knowing where you might be swept off to." – J.R.R. Tolkien, The Fellowship of the Ring

Ah, free will—the cornerstone of morality, autonomy, and existential angst. For centuries, humanity has clung to the belief that we are free agents, acting independently of any external forces. But here’s the catch: What if that freedom is more of a comforting myth than a hard fact? What if, instead of flying free like an eagle, we’re all just puppets with strings pulled by biology, environment, and our own unconscious minds?

This dilemma—whether free will can coexist with determinism—is an old one. Philosophers have debated this since Socrates got himself into hot water (mostly with people who didn’t understand his Socratic method). In Western thought, free will has typically been framed as the opposite of determinism: if determinism rules, then free will is out of the picture. If every event, including human decisions, is the inevitable result of prior causes, then it stands to reason that our sense of freedom is just an illusion. Ouch.

Daniel Dennett, in his book Elbow Room, takes a more nuanced approach. While he acknowledges that we’re all constrained by biology, environment, and the physical laws of nature, he doesn’t throw in the towel on free will. His theory of compatibilism suggests that while we’re not entirely free in the "choose anything, no strings attached" sense, we still possess meaningful freedom within those constraints. The key, according to Dennett, is that we have "elbow room"—the mental and emotional space to act in accordance with our desires and reflect on those desires.

To put it another way, Dennett argues that free will isn’t the ability to choose anything at all but the ability to choose in ways that align with our values. It’s not about being free of influence, but about exercising agency within the influences we have. And just like that, Dennett introduces us to the idea that free will is less about total freedom and more about freedom within the lines. It’s a kind of existential "zooming in" on our capacity to make meaningful choices.

Let’s circle back to Thompson. His decision to intervene in the My Lai massacre wasn’t an expression of freedom from all influence. It was shaped by his military background, his sense of duty, and the intense pressure of the moment. But within that mix of influences, Thompson exercised his "elbow room"—he acted thoughtfully and in accordance with his moral beliefs. His decision wasn’t about choosing freely from an endless list of options; it was about reflecting on the choices he had and making the one that aligned with his values.

The Neuroscientific Challenge: Sapolsky’s Determinism

"The real world is not a world of freedom." – Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity

"All the world's a stage, and all the men and women merely players." – As You Like It by William Shakespeare

Okay, so Dennett gives us "elbow room," but not everyone’s buying it. Enter Robert Sapolsky, neuroscientist and author of Behave: The Biology of Humans at Our Best and Worst, who takes a much more skeptical stance on free will. According to Sapolsky, the whole idea that we’re freely making choices is pretty much a well-spun myth. Instead, he argues, human behavior is an elaborate dance of biology, environment, and neurochemistry—factors that are so deeply interwoven that we’re not really making independent decisions at all. We’re just reacting to the play of external and internal forces.

Sapolsky’s view is rooted in his research on how the brain, hormones, and environmental triggers shape behavior. As he puts it, “Your brain is in control of everything, including your perception of free will.” For Sapolsky, your choices aren’t the result of some great, autonomous, soul-driven decision-making process—they’re the inevitable result of a complex system of biological triggers. From your genetic code to your upbringing and hormonal state, every decision you make is already encoded in a series of neural patterns before you even think you’ve made it.

Let’s go back to Thompson. According to Sapolsky, his intervention in My Lai wasn’t an act of pure free will—it was simply the result of a long chain of factors, from his upbringing to his military training to the stress response in his body. In other words, Thompson’s heroic act may have looked like a decision from free will, but Sapolsky would argue it was a deterministic act shaped by an uncountable number of variables that made it the only possible outcome in that moment. As Sapolsky puts it, “You don't get to control the stimuli that make you do what you do.” (Bummer, huh?)

Now, Sapolsky’s view may sound like it leaves us off the hook when it comes to moral responsibility, but it doesn’t. He argues that while free will is a social construct, we still need to have systems in place to hold people accountable. He believes that understanding the complex web of factors influencing behavior should lead to more compassionate and rehabilitative approaches to justice. In other words, we’re not letting people off the moral hook; we’re just changing the way we think about the punishment hook.

Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Are We Off the Hook?

“Regrets, I’ve had a few,/But then again, too few to mention.” - Frank Sinatra, My Way

So, if Sapolsky’s deterministic view holds, does that mean we’re all off the hook when it comes to moral responsibility? If our actions are determined by forces beyond our control, should we just stop punishing people for bad behavior and start sending them to therapy? Well, not so fast. This is where Dennett’s compatibilism steps in with a firm handshake.

Dennett argues that moral responsibility doesn’t get thrown out the window just because our actions are influenced by forces like biology, environment, and unconscious drives. In fact, Dennett believes that precisely because we can reflect on our actions and choose according to our values, we are morally responsible. So, while our choices may not be "free" in an absolute sense, the fact that we can deliberate and act based on our values is what makes us responsible for our behavior.

Returning to Thompson, Dennett would argue that while his decision was shaped by his military background and the moral weight of the situation, he still made a moral choice. Thompson’s intervention wasn’t about making a decision free from influence; it was about reflecting on the situation and making the decision that aligned with his values. This, for Dennett, is the essence of moral responsibility.

Now, here’s the fun part: Sapolsky would agree that moral responsibility is still necessary. However, he would take a different approach to how we treat those who fail to live up to moral standards. Instead of seeing punishment as an end, he argues that we should focus on understanding the root causes of behavior and focus on rehabilitation. After all, if our actions are shaped by factors beyond our control, perhaps the solution isn’t harsher punishment, but more compassionate ways to address the underlying causes of those actions.

The Emergent Nature of Free Will: A Middle Ground

"Do I contradict myself? Very well, then I contradict myself, I am large, I contain multitudes." – Walt Whitman, Song of Myself

Dennett’s view on free will isn’t about throwing the whole idea of freedom out the window—he’s just asking us to rethink it. He doesn’t believe free will emerges from a vacuum of total freedom, but from the intricate dance of cognitive, social, and evolutionary factors. Free will, Dennett suggests, is a bit like a game of chess: yes, you’re constrained by the rules, but within those rules, there’s a world of possibilities for strategic moves.

This is where "elbow room" really shines. Just as a chess player is free to move pieces within the constraints of the board, we’re free to make choices within the constraints of our biology and environment. And within that space, we can still engage in meaningful moral reflection and act in ways that align with our intentions and values.

Thompson’s decision to intervene in the My Lai massacre was constrained by his military background, his sense of duty, and the pressure of the moment. But within that web of influences, Thompson exercised his elbow room—his ability to reflect on the situation, choose an action, and make it happen. The freedom wasn’t in choosing from a list of infinite possibilities; it was in choosing meaningfully within a finite set of options.

Conclusion: Free Will as a Fluid Concept

“You can't always get what you want, but if you try sometimes, you get what you need.” – You Can’t Always Get What You Want by The Rolling Stones

As we look at free will through the lenses of neuroscience, evolutionary psychology, and philosophy, it becomes clear that the old, all-or-nothing conception of freedom is outdated. Daniel Dennett’s compatibilism offers a way to preserve human agency without pretending we’re all islands of perfect autonomy. By focusing on "elbow room," Dennett allows us to acknowledge the forces that shape our behavior while still maintaining that meaningful choice is possible.

On the other side of the spectrum, Robert Sapolsky offers a sobering reminder of just how much of our behavior is determined by factors beyond our control. While he questions the existence of free will, Sapolsky still advocates for a system of moral responsibility that takes into account the complexity of human behavior.

Through it all, the story of Hugh Thompson remains a powerful example of moral agency. His actions weren’t born of absolute freedom, but they were still deeply meaningful. Whether we lean toward Dennett’s compatibilism or Sapolsky’s determinism, Thompson’s choice reminds us that while our freedom might be constrained, the ability to reflect, choose, and act in accordance with our values is what makes us human. And that, my friends, is the elbow room we all have.